Abstract-Fingerprinting systems in the presence of collusive attacks are analyzed as a game between a fingerprinter and a decoder on the one hand, and a coalition of two or more attackers on the other hand. The fingerprinter distributes, to different users, different fingerprinted copies of a host data (covertext), drawn from a memoryless stationary source, embedded with different fingerprints. The coalition members create a forgery of the data while aiming at erasing the fingerprints in order not to be detected. Their action is modeled by a multiple-access channel (MAC). We analyze the performance of two classes of decoders, associated with different kinds of error events. The decoder of the first class aims at detecting the entire coalition, whereas the second is satisfied with the detection of at least one member of the coalition. Both decoders have access to the original covertext data and observe the forgery in order to identify member(s) of the coalition. Motivated by a worst case approach, we assume that the coalition of attackers is informed of the hiding strategy taken by the fingerprinter and the decoder, while they are uninformed of the attacking scheme. Achievable single-letter expressions for the two kinds of error exponents are obtained. Single-letter lower bounds are also derived for the subclass of constant composition codes. These lower and the upper bounds coincide for the error exponent of the first class. Further, for the error of the first kind, a decoder that is optimal is introduced, and the worst case attack channel is characterized.
I. INTRODUCTION
In fingerprinting systems, several copies of the same host data are embedded with different fingerprints (that designate, e.g., the different digital signatures or serial numbers of the copies they are provided with) and distributed to different users. The fingerprints identify one of many users in order to enable copyright protection. In this situation, two or more users can form a coalition, and collusive attacks on the fingerprinting system are possible and have to be taken into account in the code design. Each of the coalition members contributes his distinct fingerprinted copy in order to create a better forgery. Hence, the fingerprinting problem can be thought of as a game between the fingerprinter and the coalition of attackers.
As mentioned in [33] , the fingerprinting game is closely related to (and is actually an extension of) the watermarking game, that in turn can be modeled as a coded communication system equipped with side information, for a single user as opposed to one of many users. Watermarking systems have been studied from the information-theoretic point of view in several works 1 (see e.g., [5] , [8] , [9] , [15] , [20] , [22] , [24] - [26] , [31] , [32] , and [34] ). Several researchers (see, e.g., [2] - [4] , [6] , [7] , [10] , [13] , [16] , [18] , [19] , [27] , [28] , [30] , [35] - [38] , and references therein) have proposed and analyzed fingerprinting systems that aim at protection against collusion attacks under various conditions. In recent years, information-theoretic aspects of various models in this problem area have been analyzed by several researchers, e.g., [1] , [3] , [21] , [33] , [35] , and [37] .
In [33] , a game-theoretic model of private 2 fingerprinting systems in the presence of colluding attacks is presented and analyzed. The players of the game are on the one hand an encoder-decoder and on the other hand, a few attackers. The decoder is facing the rather complicated goal of reliably identifying coalition members based on the forgery and the covertext. The distortion between the forgery and the original data should not exceed a certain level.
A realistic worst case approach, taken in [33] , is based on the assumption that the attackers are informed of the covertext distribution and the coding-decoding strategy (up to a random secret key), whereas the encoder and decoder are not informed of the attack strategy. Thus, the encoder and decoder are assumed to adopt a random coding strategy as a means of protection against malicious attackers. Random coding is enabled by a secret key that specifies the particular codebook that has been drawn, which is shared by the encoder and decoder. The action of the attackers is allowed to be stochastic, and therefore one can model the attack by a multiple-access channel (MAC), whose output is the forgery and whose inputs are fingerprinted copies that are observed by the coalition members.
The problem of the maximin game between the fingerprinter and the MAC applied by the users is addressed in [33] . Two types of decoders are considered: a single-output (SO) decoder whose single output is a message index and a multiple-output (MO) decoder whose output is a list containing L message indices (where L is the size of the coalition). The two decoders aim at detecting only one member of the coalition. When the SO decoder is concerned, an error is declared if its output does not belong to the coalition, whereas when the MO decoder is concerned, an error is declared when none of its outputs belongs to the coalition. The reason for aiming at this goal (adopted also in, e.g., [3] , [30] , and references therein) is that when the forgery is required to resemble to at least one of the fingerprinted copies observed by the attacker, the target of detecting the entire coalition is impossible since the attacker can decide to almost ignore one of its inputs, and thus prevent reliable decoding of the input that was ignored.
It is assumed in [33] that the encoder uses constant composition (CC) codes and under this assumption, a single-letter expression for the capacity of the private fingerprinting game with respect to (w.r.t.) the two types of decoders is found, and it is shown that their capacities are the same. Asymptotically optimal strategies, taken by the adversaries, are characterized. Also, lower bounds on the error exponents of the two types of decoders are derived.
In this correspondence, we analyze private fingerprinting systems from a different perspective. Two kinds of error events are investigated. An error of the first kind is associated with a decoder that aims at decoding the entire coalition, whereas an error of the second kind is associated with a decoder whose target is to identify at least one member of the coalition. The setup of the game is similar to the one investigated in [33] , with a few modifications.
• The first modification is that here, a more refined analysis of error exponents is performed while in [33] , the capacity is the main 1 For a more comprehensive survey, see [33] . 2 Two models of the game may be considered: the private game in which the covertext is available also at the decoder's side, and the public game, where it is only available to the encoder. quantity of interest (although some lower bounds on the error exponents are provided as well).
• The second difference between this correspondence and [33] concerns the distortion constraint imposed on the attacker. In this correspondence, the distortion between each of the fingerprinted copies observed by the attacker and the forgery he produces should be kept small, whereas in [33] it is sufficient to maintain a small amount of distortion between the forgery and one of the observed fingerprinted copies. This difference stems from the need to prevent an attack strategy that almost ignores one of its inputs, thereby rendering the goal of identifying the entire coalition impossible. Moreover, although ignoring one of the observed fingerprinted copies is a "legitimate" attack, it makes no sense that an effort will be made by the attacker to enlarge his coalition (by purchasing as many legal copies as possible), and then, at the end, ignore some of them.
We define the achievable error exponent of the first/second kind as a number E such that there exists a random CC scheme, whose asymptotic performance in terms of average probability of error (in the logarithmic scale) of the first/second kind is given by E , assuming the attacker knows the encoding-decoding scheme and can adopt the worst case strategy associated with the kind of error of interest. Single-letter lower and upper bounds are provided for the error exponents of the first and second kinds. In the case of an error of the first kind, the lower and upper bounds coincide, while when the error of the second kind is concerned, they may coincide for a certain range of low rates. Another important result is that we show that one can use a universal decoder (used also in [33] ) that is asymptotically optimal for the error of the first kind. We also deduce lower bounds on the capacities of the fingerprinting games corresponding to the two kinds of errors. This correspondence is organized as follows: In Section II, some notation conventions are defined. A statement of the problem, which is relevant to the entire correspondence, is given in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our main results concerning the set of achievable error exponents, and Section V is devoted to a discussion of the results. Finally, the proofs of the theorems and lemmas appear in the Appendix.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Henceforth, we adopt the following notation conventions. Random variables (RVs) will be denoted by capital letters, while their realizations will be denoted by the respective lower case letters. Random vectors of dimension n will be denoted by boldface letters. Thus, for example, if X X X denotes a random vector (X1; . . . ; Xn), then x x x = (x 1 ; . . . ; x n ) will designate a specific sample value of X X X . The alphabet of a scalar RV, X , will be designated by the corresponding caligraphic letter X . The n-fold Cartesian power of a generic alphabet A, that is, the set of all n-vectors over A, will be denoted A n .
The set of probability mass functions (pmfs), defined on an alphabet X , will be denoted by P(X), and the set of conditional pmfs from U to X will be denoted P(XjU), i.e., the set of P (xju); x 2 X; u 2 U such that P (xju) 0, and x 2X P (x 0 ju) = 1; 8(u;x) 2 U 2 X.
The notation 1fAg, where A is an event, will designate the indicator function of A, i.e., 1fAg=1 if A occurs, and 1fAg=0 otherwise. We adopt the convention that if a set T is empty, then min t2T f (t) = 1, and similarly, max t2T f (t) = 01. The notation c n 1 = d n , for two sequences fcng n1 and fdng n1 , will express asymptotic equality in the exponential scale, i.e., lim n!1 For a given empirical pmfP 2 n(A), define the set of conditional empirical pmfs, n (B;P ), as the set of P 2 P(BjA) such that nP (a)P (bja) is an integer for all (a; b) 2 A 2 B.
Information-theoretic quantities, such as the entropy of the random variable X, whose pmf is P , will be denoted by either H P (X) or H(P ) interchangeably. Similarly, the mutual information between X and Y given U , with joint pmf P will be denoted by IP (X; Y jU), etc. The divergence, or Kullback-Leibler distance, between two pmfs P and Q on A, where jAj < 1, is defined as
where we use the convention that 0 log 0 = 0 and p log p 0 = 1.
Information-theoretic quantities governed by empirical measures induced by the n-vectors u u u; x x x; y y y, will have a special notation, e.g., 
The notation U $ X $ Y will signify that the RVs U; X; Y , in this order, form a Markov chain. We shall have a particular interest in strongly exchangeable channels. A strongly exchangeable channel is defined as a conditional distribution P Y Y Y jX X XX X X with input alphabet (X n ) 2 and output alphabet Y n for which, for every x x x 0 2 X n ; x x x 2 X n ; y y y 2 Y n and every permutation of f1; . 
Obviously, every discrete memoryless channel (DMC) is strongly exchangeable.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
As mentioned earlier, the setup of the game considered in this correspondence resembles the one investigated in [33] with several modifications discussed in the Introduction. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we include the entire description of the modified game here. Let U; X; and Y be finite sets designating the alphabets of a covertext symbol, fingerprinted symbol, and forgery symbol, respectively.
For convenience, we assume 3 U = X . Let U U U designate the random covertext sequence within which the fingerprints are to be hidden. The n-vector U U U is composed of n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) RVs whose joint pmf is denoted by P n U with single-letter marginal pmf P U , and we shall assume that min u2U P U (u) > 0. The fingerprinter creates, at random, M = b2 nR c fingerprinted versions of 3 It is natural to make this assumption, because one of the things one wants to keep secret is the very existence of fingerprints. If U 6 = X, it would be immediately apparent that the image or signal is fingerprinted. the covertext, denoted X X X i; i = 1; . . . ; M , and will be referred to as a codebook.
A secret key K n is an RV, independent of the fingerprints and the covertext, known to both the encoder and decoder, but unknown to the attacker. Let K n stand for the alphabet of K n , and let P K stand for the distribution of K n .
Definition 1:
A rate-R fingerprinting encoder of block length n is a function which maps the secret key realization k n , the covertext data u u u, and the watermark message m 2 Mn into a stegotext vector (or, fingerprinted vector) x x x, i.e.,
where Mn = f1; . . . ; Mg:
Having created the fingerprinted copies X X X i ; i 2 M n , the encoder distributes them arbitrarily to M different users. We assume that the distributed copies meet the following distortion constraint w.r.t. a given distortion level D 1 , i.e., As mentioned earlier, we analyze two kinds of errors: the first refers to a decoder that aims at decoding the two messages (detecting the entire coalition), and the second refers to a decoder that is less ambitious and is satisfied with correct decoding of at least one of the messages. We refer to the resulting errors as error of the first kind and error of the second kind, respectively. The quadruple Fn = (PK ; fn; Mn;n) will be referred to as a rate-R randomized fingerprinting code. Definition 2: Let N n (D 1 ) be the set of mappings n : U n ! P(XjU), s.t.
and n(u u u) 2 n(X ;Pu u u); 8u u u 2 U n .
We shall focus on the following subclass of fingerprinting codes.
Definition 3:
A rate-R CC fingerprinting code of block length n is a code with the following structure of a secret key and encoder: the 4 In the general fingerprinting game, the coalition may have more than two members. However, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case of two coalition members. The results can be extended to a general coalition size. 5 In [33] , the constraint is i.e., it is given by Tu u u(n(u u u)).
In the sequel, we shall use the abbreviation
Denote by F d n (R) the set of rate-R randomized CC fingerprinting codes induced by a mapping n 2 N n (D 1 ). A code F n 2 F d n (R) is therefore defined by the triple ( n ; n ; R).
The fact that we focus on the wide class of CC fingerprinting encoders can be justified by practical considerations. As explained in [33] , any practical randomized encoder should have some enumeration mechanism, where one first randomly selects a number under the uniform distribution in some range (in particular, an integer according to the key), and then this number is mapped to a codeword (given U U U ). It is desired then that to implement this mapping, one should not need (exponentially) large tables but can use a simple function. It is well known that there are indeed simple ways to enumerate sequences which belong to the same type class. See, for example, [11] , where such an enumeration method is proposed, and the same idea can be easily extended to conditional type classes.
For a given realization of a secret key K n , let the output of the decoder be given byŴ = (Ŵ 1 ;Ŵ 2 ) = n (K n ; U U U ; Y Y Y ). An error of the first kind occurs when not all coalition members are correctly detected 7 and an error of the second kind occurs if no coalition member is correctly detected by the decoder, hence, the average probability of error of the first and second kinds are given by PrfŴ1 6 = Wa;Ŵ1 6 = W b ;Ŵ2 6 = Wa;Ŵ2 6 = W b g (9) respectively, where the probability is induced by the covertext, the members of the coalition, the ensemble of all possible codebooks, and the action of the attack channel P Y Y Y jX X X X X X , when the randomized code F n is employed. Similar definitions apply for the achievable rate and the CC capacity w.r.t. error of the second kind C (2) (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ). 6 We require that 2 N (D ) in order to consider conditional types such that constraint (5) is met. 7 In the rare case where W = W , it is sufficient that eitherŴ = W or W = W .
Define the negative normalized log error probability of the fingerprinting game w.r.t. error of the first and second kinds when the code F n = ( n ; n ; R) is applied
n (PU ; D1; D2; n; n; R) 0 1 n log P (i) e (n; n; R; P Y Y Y jX X X X X X ) (10) where i = 1; 2, respectively.
Definition 6:
The error exponents of the fingerprinting game w.r.t. errors of the first and second kinds at rate R are defined by
n (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ; n ; n ; R) (11) i = 1; 2, respectively, where the maximization is performed over f n 2 N n (D 1 ); n g and the minimization is over fP Y Y Y jX X X X X X 2P D n g.
Our main goal in this correspondence is to establish a closed-form expression for the error exponents of the fingerprinting game w.r.t. errors of the first and second kinds at rate R.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
For a given measure PŨ X 2 P(U 2 X), let P d (PŨ X ; D 2 ) designate the set of conditional measures PX Y jŨX 2P(X2YjU2X) such that P XjŨ = PX jŨ and maxfEd 2 (X; Y ); Ed 2 (X; Y )g D 2 , where the conditional measures P XjŨ and PX jŨ are the appropriate marginals of PŨ X 2 PX Y jŨX , and the expectations are w.r.t. PŨ X 2 PX Y jŨX .
For a given pmf P = PŨ XXY 2 P(U 2 X (14) where the outmost minimization is over PŨ 2 P(U), the maximization is over P XjŨ such that Ed 1 (Ũ ; X) D 1 , and the inner minimization is over PX Y jŨX 2 P d (PŨ X ; D 2 ). The measure P Y jXX is the appro- where the outmost minimization is over PŨ 2 P(U), the maximization is over P X jŨ such that Ed 1 (Ũ ; X) D 1 , and the inner minimization is over PX Y jŨ X 2 P d (PŨ X ; D2) such that minfI P (X;XY jŨ);I P (X; XY jŨ)g R. The following theorem provides lower and upper bounds on the error exponent of the second kind. 
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix B.
Remarks:
• Let R0(PU ; D1; D2) be the infimum of those rates for which the constraint minfIP (X;XY jŨ);IP (X; XY jŨ)g R appearing in the inner minimization in (17) becomes effective. Then, the bounds coincide for R 2 [0; R0(PU ; D1; D2)).
• is a result of the averaging over the types.
V. DISCUSSION
Consider the following decoder (also considered in [33] ), denoted 
where ties are broken arbitrarily. In Appendix A1 we prove that this decoder achieves the lower bound on the average probability of error of the first kind. Hence, it is asymptotically optimal and can be regarded as a universal decoder for the class of channels P D n , w.r.t. random CC coding and error of the first kind.
Since jT x x xx x x ju u uy y y j 1 = e nĤ , the alternative decoder having the same asymptotic performance as that of (19) , is given by 
As the value of the maxmin exponent is determined by the dominant joint type class (of the covertext sequence, the two fingerprinted copies of the coalition members and the forgery), an attack channel denoted
that assigns equal probability to all the conditional type classes
x such that the distortion constraint is not violated and is uniform within each conditional type class is introduced. Namely 
where c n;x x
x;x x x is the appropriate polynomial normalization factor. This channel is shown to be a worst case attack channel w.r.t. the error exponent of the first kind, and it is also used in the derivation of the upper bound on the error exponent of the second kindẼ b (PU ; D1; D2; R) (in (18) ).
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 involve the following lemma (proved independently also in [29] ) whose proof appears in Appendix C. 
This lemma implies that the union bound on the random coding error exponent is tight, and this lemma can also be used in other contexts such as in [14] to simplify the derivation.
The derivation performed in this correspondence provides also lower bounds on the capacities of the fingerprinting systems corresponding to the two kinds of errors, which are given by the smallest rates for which E i (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ; R) = 0; i = a; b. It is easily verified that this yields the following lower bounds: (24) where U PU ;X is an RV which is independent of X given U and satisfies PX jU = P X jU , and U $ (X;X) $ Y , the maximizations are over fP X jŨ : E P P d 1 (U; X ) D 1 g and the minimizations are over P Y jXX such that The difference between the lower bound on the error exponent of the second kind, E b (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ; R), and the lower bound on the error exponent of the MO decoder of [33] is that while in E b (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ; R) (see (14) ) the minimization is over PX Y jŨ X 2 P d (PŨ X ; D2), the bound in [33] includes a minimization over PX Y jŨ X such that P X jŨ = P X jU and This difference stems from the different distortion constraints imposed on the attacker.
In spite of the differences between the model of the ordinary MAC and the present scenario (see the discussion in the Introduction), the lower bound on the capacity C (1) (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ) bears some resemblance to the capacity region of the MAC. The capacity region of the MAC given input distributions P 1 (X); P 2 (X) is given by the set of rate pairs (R 1 ; R 2 ), satisfying 
In the case of two users who (use the same codebook and hence) have the same rate R1 = R2 = R, the corresponding upper limit is where U is some auxiliary RV (used for time sharing) with distribution on some finite alphabet, 8 P XjU and PX jU are conditional distributions (that can be optimized) defined on P(XjU) and P(XjU), respectively, with X;X being the inputs alphabets of the channel, and the minimization is over V UXXY 2 P(U 2 X 2X 2 Y) with marginals V UX = P UX and V UX = P UX . The main differences between (26) and Ea(PU ; D1; D2; R) stem from the distortion constraints imposed on both parties of the fingerprinting game and from the fact that we consider a coalition of two users sharing the same codebook and thus operating at the same rate. It should be noted that while U in E a (P U ; D 1 ; D 2 ; R) represents a covertext symbol, in [17] it stands for a time-sharing symbol. A modification of the derivation performed in this correspondence (the lower bound on P (1) e (Fn; P Y Y Y jX X X X X X )), can be used to show that the bound of [17] is tight in the random coding sense.
APPENDIX A

A. Proof of Theorem 1 1) Proof of the Direct Part of Theorem 1:
The performance of the decoder 3 n (see (19) ) will serve as an upper bound on the average probability of error attainable by the optimal decoder. The encoder is a CC fingerprinting code defined by a mapping n 2 Nn(D1) that satisfies the following condition: n(u u u) = n(u u u) (27) for all u u u 2 U n and every permutation of f1; . . . ; ng. In other words, the channel from U U U to X X X is strongly exchangeable (see the definition before (2)).
Without loss of generality, 9 one can assume that the transmitted messages indices are (1; 2). With a little abuse of notation, we shall denote by P P P M u u u the joint pmf of fX X X i g M i=1 conditioned on the event U U U = u u u, and by P P x ju u uy y y g: (28) 8 It is proved in [17] that the size of the alphabet of U can be 4 without loss of generality. 9 The case w = w can be treated similarly.
Assuming the covertext is u u u, the codewords observed by the attacker are x x x 1 ; x x x 2 , and y y y is the forgery, the probability that the proposed decoder (19) fails to decode the entire coalition is given by 
where the three summands in (29) correspond to i) error only inŴ2, ii) error inŴ 1 only, and iii) error in bothŴ 1 andŴ 2 , respectively. Next, we present a key lemma that will be used to evaluate (30) and the lower bound as well. Recall the abbreviation (8). 
The lemma is proved in Appendix C.
Obviously, by (30) and (32) 
where ( 
We thus have established the upper bound for every n and n max P 2P P (1) e ( n ; 
where Pr(u u u; x x x 1 ; x x x 2 ) = P n U (u u u) where in (48) the outmost minimization is over PŨ 2 n (U ), the maximization is over P XjŨ 2 n (X ; PŨ ) : Ed 1 (Ũ ; X) D 1 , and the innermost minimization is over PX Y jŨX 2 n(X 2Y;PŨ X ): s.t. PX jŨ = P XjŨ and maxfEd 2 (X; Y ); Ed 2 (X; Y )g D 2 .
The gap between the right-hand side (RHS) of (48) and Ea(PU; D1; D2; R) is only in that in (48), the optimizations are over empirical measures while in (14) the optimizations are over sets of continuous measures. Due to continuity considerations, as n tends infinity, the RHS of (48) converges to Ea(PU; D1; D2; R).
2) Proof of the Converse Part of Theorem 1:
When deriving a lower bound on the average probability of error, one can assume a) that the attacker is constrained to use a strongly exchangeable channel and b) that the channel is known at the decoder's side which can implement the maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding rule. The next lemma will be used to establish a lower bound on the probability of error of the ML decoder under these assumptions.
Lemma 5:
For any fixed codebook and a known channel that is strongly exchangeable, the ML decoder assigns the same likelihood to two pairs of codewords that lie in the same conditional type given and Lemma 5 follows.
Thus, the probability that the ML decoder fails (given u u u; x x x 1; x x x 2; y y y)
is lower-bounded as follows:
Prferror of ML decoder, exchangeable channel ju u ux x x 1x x x 2y y yg 
where in the RHS of (51) it is assumed that the exchangeable channel is known at the decoder.
We can now use (33) to lower bound the RHS of (51). where (53) is due to the fact that q M (see (34) ) is decreasing with M. The fact that the bounds (38) and (57) coincide yields that the average probability of error (given u u u; x x x 1 ; x x x 2 ; y y y) of the proposed decoder (19) achieves the lower bound on the average probability of error attainable by the ML decoder which corresponds to every strongly exchangeable channel that is known at the decoder. 
P P P
where Pr(u u u; x x x 1; x x x 2; y y y) is as in (44) The gap between (43) and (58) 
B. Proof of Theorem 2 1) Proof of the Lower Bound of Theorem 2:
Recall the definition of G3(x x x 0 ; x x x 00 ; u u u; y y y) in (28) . When the error of the second kind is concerned, the probability that the proposed decoder (19) fails to decode at least one member of the coalition is given by
Prferror of the proposed decoder ju u ux x x 1x x x 2y y yg = P P P 
We have 
where the last step follows since C M (u u ux x x 0 x x x 00 y y y) is increasing with jT x x x x x x ju u uy y y j.
We thus have established the upper bound for every n and n max P 2P P (1) e ( n ; , and this concludes the proof of the left-hand side (LHS) of (18) .
2) Proof of the Upper Bound of Theorem 2:
Similarly to the argumentation used in the analysis of the error of the first kind, when deriving a lower bound on the probability of error of the second kind, one can assume a) that the attacker is constrained to use strongly exchangeable channels and b) that the channel is known at the decoder's side which can implement an optimal decoding rule w.r.t. the error of the second kind. We next characterize this optimal decoder. Recall that B B B u u u denotes the codebook corresponding to u u u. First, note that given (u u u; y y y) and when the optimal decoder for the error of second kind is used, if there exists another pair (x x x i ; x x x j ) where i 3 
where the second inequality follows from (33) , and the third inequality 
where Pr(u u u; x x x 1 ; x x x 2 ; y y y) is as in (44) 
C. Proofs of Lemmas 1) Proof of Lemma 1:
The RHS inequality of (22) 
where (a) holds because 
3) Proof of Lemma 3:
In light of (43), it is sufficient to show that RHS of (43) is upper-bounded by the RHS of (46). 
where x x x designates the sequence x x x permuted according to . Since P n U is memoryless, the encoder satisfies (27) 
Note that 
Note that, in fact, the quantity 0(u u u; n (u u u)) depends on u u u only through its type class Tu u u and the mapping n(u u u). 
where (a) follows from the fact that for a given P 2 P(XjU); 0(u u u; P) depends on u u u only via its type class, (b) is because 3 n is a minimizer of 0(u u u; n (u u u)); (c) follows from the same reasoning as (a), and Next note that since n 2 Nn(D1) is a mapping from u u u to P(XjU), 
where the outmost minimization is over PŨ 2 n(U), the maximization is over P XjŨ 2 n (X ; PŨ ) : Ed 1 (Ũ; X) D 1 , and the innermost minimization is over PX Y jŨ;X 2 n(X 2 Y;PŨ ;X ) : s.t. PX jŨ = P XjŨ and maxfEd2(X; Y ); Ed2(X; Y )g D2.
